Although mortally wounding to know one’s own government ordered such decapitations, one must reflect on the changing political landscape for the answers. The ever widening gulf between moderate foreign policy and extreme foreign policy seem unexplainable and irreconcilable. With that in mind, one must evaluate the relationship by examining the US’s treatment of Marxist-revolutions in three unchanged dimensions: military aid, training, and subversion. Although these devices were employed to confront the communist threat, each of these devices originated in a phase of insular planning and calculated premeditation, only later to become increasingly radicalized through network decentralization and the over-application of cold war pretexts. Furthermore, even though the US made no significant changes to its hemispheric policies towards communism, the US did liberalize the application of these devices which precipitated into more violence and disunity amidst waning justification for the cold war.

What does this have to do with influencing revolutions and their reactions to them? As the United States liberalized the use of military aid, training, and subversion, the revolutions that acted against them became more radicalized in not only seeking to do public damage to the US, but in also networking with other insurgencies in a general aim to undermine the US and its allies. In addition, the more the US liberalized methods to support dictators, the more those dictators used disproportionate force to not only create enemies out of their citizens, but to also gain support for the very revolutions that they set out to excise.

The idea that enablers of foreign policy, like the CIA, embassy representatives, or congress at large, appropriated better foreign policy decisions in the past may sound indeterminable – however, if conclusions can be inferred events should be regarded chronologically. In essence, the Guatemala experience illustrated a more centralized policy within the CIA – of adherence to strict precedent and measured due diligence. Indeed, the lack of a strict chain-of-command and military predictability seen in the US-backed Salvadoran army contrasts very heavily to the synchronized CIA of 1952-1953. To say more of this, the US was more conscience of international backlash at the time, something that seemed irrelevant in the cases of Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador during the eighties. Even though the CIA made plans to incite a rebellion through Somoza and Castillo Armas, the agency quickly dropped them after they realized Somoza had unveiled specifics to others – namely, to Somoza’s son. The CIA’s dramatic retreat in this example is symptomatic of a more consequence-oriented agency, one which wanted to add no further controversy to the Organization of American States or the United Nations and one which of yet, had not been contaminated by network decentralization (Operation PBSUCCESS19).

Moreover, unlike the unsubstantiated cold war pretexts referenced during the later interventions, the US in this case divined a partially-reasoned threat. The existence of China as the first communist country outside the eastern bloc alarmed the US, pushing its departments and agencies to consider the next possible thing: communism in America’s backyard. This, in conjunction with escalating Soviet technology (specifically, their acquisition of nuclear weapons) exacerbated the situation – a confluence that doomed Guatemala to misinterpretation. Even though the US overestimated the power of Fortuny and much of the disempowered communist party, the US did so understandably given the slow march of communist advancement in both geographic size and technical prowess (PBSUCCESS 20).

Yet, even with these broader concerns, the CIA acted with reserved tact for much of their observation, hoping instead, that “the pendulum in Guatemala would swing back” (PBSUCCESS 20). The CIA’s preference for observation as opposed to impulsive action comes into collision with Reagan policy of the eighties – which was recklessly established and stubbornly recycled. The seemingly indiscriminate and disastrous operations of Nicaragua-bound contra groups along with Salvadorian and Guatemalan death squads differed from the coordinated CIA operation of Guatemala (1952-1953) which enrolled the support of only limited actors, and which invariably tried to reduce exposure as much as possible. Even as the US tried to align itself with this “political nonentity”, its initial actions (in 1952 and 1953) were largely clandestine proceedings which operated at the behest of US foreign policy interest, acting – simultaneously, to undermine a leftist government while also marshaling support for free enterprise and democracy. Operations in Guatemala seemed to proceed in highly centralized and secretive top-down arrangements, which did well to prevent mismanagement caused by decentralized networks.

The principle argument used to overstep international convention was the impending fear of communism, a topic which was aggressively pursued by the CIA and other organizations despite the deficit in evidence or probability. In the case of Guatemala the evidence was weak but still competitive. In fact, the existence of a legitimized communist party raised brows, along with the evidence that Arbenz had been cooperating with communists despite their fringe existence in the legislature. In contrast, the US government in Cuba had a harder time containing the insincerity of cold war pandering from wider audiences, showing – in particular, the government’s depreciating face as a neutral arbiter. Unlike the crumbling trust of US actions in Cuba, the CIA in Guatemala enjoyed greater credibility through the acquisition of real, though unpersuasive, communist links. These links were what partially deflected international criticism – a catalyst which possibly led to the over-application of cold war justifications.

In 1955 the famed J Edgar Hoover came to the conclusion that Castro’s 26th of July Movement was not communist and therefore not relevant to cold war concerns (Paterson 15). Hoover’s conclusion that Castro posed no immediate threat was adopted by the rank-and-file, prompting the CIA to continue acting with the same suspended judgment as seen in Guatemala. This, along with Cuba’s geographic isolation from the Kremlin, afforded the US a well appropriated disposition, one of wait and see, much like Guatemala. The problem with this assessment was that the US did not have the credibility to make such an investigation given their support for Batista – who, during the 1930s, made a political arrangement with communists to garner political support (Paterson 17). From the onset, the hypocrisy became a blistering self-indictment of US policy, one of the many firsts which condemned the cold war pretext to empty rhetorical functions.

Batista’s move to absolve himself of this communist history meant criminalizing the communist party, which was the eventual effect, but which did little to restore US foreign policy cohesiveness, much less a cold war connection. The United States, in addition, had expanded its language and framing of the cold war to include economic interests, claiming that communist governments would create “denied areas” or “defections” from the regular free enterprise market (Paterson 58). This new approach to communism seemed to widen interpretation to include other domains – an observation that began to smell more and more like an imperialist’s plot. The ebbing justification for US aggression was, in addition, a flaw capitalized on by the enemy – becoming a virtual rallying-point for rebels. US devolution and loss of credibility was best framed by ex-president Prio Soccarras’s experience: “In other words, a government which came into power in Cuba by usurpation, and which maintains a military dictatorship, can buy arms in the United States, but a constitutionally elected president is put in jail for trying to assist in the overthrow of that government?” (Paterson 120).

The widening cold war domain and the relating diminished justification did not rally international support, as can be intuited, but materialized into US military support beyond the scope of Guatemala. Previous small-arms smuggled to Castillo Armas were now dwarfed by financial commitments of two to three million dollars, a deployment which could not have been made without the misapplication of cold war talk. In addition, umbrella organizations like MAP and MAAG oversaw the growth of military arms and training despite the proclaimed caveat that they only be used for “hemispheric defense” (Paterson 58, 59). The Batista government had no problem managing this generosity, and overall found this arrangement opportune for controlling domestic unrest with the many submachine guns, hand grenades, armored cars, recoilless rifles, radio equipment, and air craft supplies he had acquired (Paterson 58). As time progressed people began to realize that “hemispheric defense” would come at a horrible cost to civil society.

The loss of a clear field of view for the CIA became pathetically apparent amid the decentralization in Cuba. In specific, a report came out claiming that the CIA had been funding Castro in addition to Batista, a statement which cited a 50,000 donation sent through Santiago (Paterson 64). It may be that “the leak” of Salvadorian weapons in the early eighties had its genesis here when the US funded both groups, a matter which is of no slight importance for those victimized by weapons proliferation. The enlarging print of US design was definitely more protruding in the Cuban case than in the Guatemalan case, and the inference to do so came from active involvement of the FBI and CIA in coordinating and maintaining Batista’s secret police (SIM) and BRAC (a group designed to infiltrate communist activities) (Paterson 65). In content, it seems like the decentralization of CIA networks into the secret police and BRAC along with the exhaustion of cold war pretexts reflected/encouraged the liberalization of CIA (subversion) and military aid policies.

Although the image of an unelected dictator awash in US weaponry denotes policy liberalization, the US maintained considerable worry for an international reaction, and thus acted conservatively in some regards. In specific, the US government did not allow their MAAG officers to advise Cuban soldiers on how to defeat the rebels, an accommodation which was lifted under Reagan as he allowed for the training of the notorious Atlacatl brigade (60 Paterson). As an appendage, the US also corresponded with their embassy with more frequency, trying – in particular, to assess the extent of human rights abuses to communicate, in effect, the extent to which those abuses could continue without reprisals. The embassy underneath Ambassador Gardner showed no hesitation in reporting the “recurrent killings” and “extreme methods of brutality” which the Batista regime exhibited, a stark departure from the overall acquiescence of the US embassy in El Salvador (Paterson 72). Moreover, the US government also halted arms purchases on March 14 1955 amid unfair election requirements (Paterson 130). When looked at together however, the evidence suggests that despite flagrant violations, the US still pursued last-ditch operations to preserve the legitimacy of the cold war pretext. Consider the USIS, a group which was directed by the US embassy to distribute propaganda and other information through reporting (47 Paterson). Though these measures did accumulate into something, the US was not able to contain the misappropriation of cold war justification and the resulting policy liberalizations in military aid, training, and subversion.

Indeed, the reaction from the Cuban people was a denouncement of the US adventurism that empowered Batista. What remains instructive is that the liberalization of US policy invoked a hard-line reaction in Cuba, which increased civil strife, and which in turn encouraged more support for the rebels. One can draw similar conclusions to the war on terror which is conducted in a similar manner, and which also undermines its own purposes when executed (you can’t deter terrorism by invading another country and spawning more recruits). With that in mind, the participation of the US heightened opposition to Batista at the benefit of the rebels. Although Cuba eclipsed the size and scale of US actions in Guatemala, the example of Central America underneath Reagan epitomizes the radicalization of military aid, training, and subversion.

The completely unanticipated leveling and mass-murder committed by the Salvadorian army underneath Reagan is sometimes incomprehensible in wreck and ruin. The annihilation of some nine-hundred people in El Mozote pales in comparison to the earlier mismanagements, which leads us then to the zenith of US incrimination and mishandling. The noted policy liberalizations here are almost disenchanting in irresponsibility, nevertheless, the Reagan administration ardently supported the conservative reaction to the rise of the progressive military junta in El Salvador. The administration, amid the struggle to suppress the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, conformed to the new conservative military junta’s dirty war to root out suspected leftists. As opposed to Guatemala where communist suspicions were loosely connected or in Cuba where communism – overtime – was implied, the communist connection in El Salvador remained miniscule even when the methods to alleviate it were more sweeping and crude (kill all leftists). The denial of justification to the people, much less a cold war justification, remained largely absent.

Although both El Salvador and Cuba received military training and support, the US in the former seemed to forfeit their control to the army and secret service, a decentralizing effect with disastrous results. The autonomy given to the Salvadorian army along with the decentralization of US-influenced movements therein resulted in a killing-spree that “outran the intelligence capability of the army” (Danner 27), meaning – in other words – that leftists profiling got so indiscriminate that everyone was targeted. As corpses surfaced “there was no secret about who was doing the killing”, as one embassy official said, unless of course you were in the noiseless halls of the White House (Danner 27). Even still, the US fanatically pursued supposed communist in-roads in an increasingly schizophrenic way. Rather than observing from afar, the US was now directing aggression from the pentagon by communicating demands that the Salvadorian army uproot insurgents from Morazan to prevent their coalescence into a belligerent force – all of which, with an unproven connection to the Soviet Union (Danner 32). With El Salvador, the application of the cold war pretext became completely saturated and void of evidence, other than the fact that the Sandinistas supported them – who, if one remembers, also had dubious and largely unproven relationships with the Kremlin. This expansion of what counted as communist drove the sometimes insane and unhinged liberalizing policies that have ruined so many countless lives.

In contrast with the restraints kept on US military advisers in Cuba, US Special Forces were dispatched to not only train soldiers against guerillas (which overturned previous policy), but to also hone specific skill sets like seizing posts and shooting (Danner 38). This – complemented by the issuance of M-16′s, M-60′s, mortars, and rifles – departed greatly from the unreliable and intermittent arms shipments of Castillo Armas and Batista. The endeavors of other periods were largely eclipsed by this new phase of US adventurism which culminated into huge endorsements for militarization, an initiative which represented some 35 million in aid to El Salvador in one year (Danner 40). This militarization included the training of infantry on US soil, probably one of the most flagrant of all transgressions (Danner 49). The enormity of the commitment was well understood by the pentagon, a fact which was demonstrated by its incessant correspondence with General Woerner, along with their overbearing influence over tactical movements (specifically those regarding Morazan). Although this shows the centralizing powers of the Pentagon, much of the actual execution was delivered by a decentralized rank-and-file which responded to General Monterrosa, the latter of which rarely reported to the American military advisors even when subpoenaed.

The nature of the response from the United States after the Salvadorian army had massacred hundreds without reason proves instructive. The United States did not confirm nor deny the event, despite coordinated recognition from many human rights groups (some even directed by the Catholic Church) (Danner 125). The US stayed painfully quiet on the issue, reducing the possibility to Venceremos propaganda – an excuse that is uniquely delusional in its cold war context. The most shocking part of this deafening silence though was the denial, especially when confronted with evidence that ten US military advisers had been attached to one of the implicated groups (Danner 93). By adding insult to injury, the US also claimed that civilians were pressured to leave the zone, that incidentally some didn’t, and that defense positions were targeted despite these remaining populations (Danner 111). Rife with lies, the extent of US misdeeds here is unparalleled. After the massacre and after Ambassador Hinton dismissed it as a “novella”, the US congress approved an increase of military aid to 82 million dollars thereafter (Danner 142).

As congress passed increased military aid to El Salvador, the US was also deploying hundreds of Nicaragua-bound contra units from undisclosed sites in Honduras (Chomsky 1). Indeed, as decentralization occurred the network expanded to absorb Honduras, who also consistently violated human-rights accords. Operations in Nicaragua to dismount the popular Sandinistas resulted in huge costs to its inhabitants, resulting in countless deaths and destruction that totaled in the billions (Chomsky 1). Even though the US had blatantly contravened international law, as seen by unanimous rulings by the World Court and United Nations, the US still belligerently dismissed its complicity (Chomsky 1). The strategy professed by the pentagon at the time was to mount a sweeping offensive against leftists who may or may not be communist. This strategy which already found residence in El Salvador was also adopted in Guatemala, as illustrated in the chilling memory of the EMP.

The extent of US involvement was now blaring in each of these examples, with a paper trail that had included Israel, Taiwan, and even Iran as possible co-conspirators, representing a scheme now fully decentralized (Goldman 7). In retrospect, how did the US change from a communist crusader to a Central American butcher? Why did the US support the Guatemalan army despite its reputation for being “the most brutal, corrupt, and criminal military institution in the western hemisphere” (14 Art of Political Murder)?
To answer these questions one must follow the general evolution of US intervention, which seemed to progress from the largely clean Guatemalan coup, to the rough and imprecise handling of Cuba, and finally to the total miscalculation and disproportionate damage of Central America. When juxtaposing these phases one will notice huge disparities in weapons aid, military training, and subversion, characteristics which have been a function of cold war pretexts and network orientation. When examining the progression of these cases however, one should be cognizant that US antagonism increases only after tolerance is established from the last foreign policy excursion. The liberalization of military aid, training, and subversion then relies on a justified antecedent to standardize the acceptability of co-conspirators (decentralization) along with the applicability of cold war pretexts. Consider Guatemala, US actions there set precedents for collusion, networking, decentralization, and the application of cold war connections, exercises later to be referenced during the much weaker justification for the Cuban cause. In a sense, the aftermath of the Cuban encounter then became the reference point for Central American initiatives when considering degrees of collusion, decentralization, networking, and military aid. As the US grew more brazen, inexact, and antagonistic, one concludes that the liberalization of intervention was not just due to the higher applicability of cold war conflicts and decentralization, but also due to sheer referencing/reinforcement.

The role of the United States in regards to Marxist revolutions then, was of the antagonist that increasingly raised the stakes, and therefore costs, of their given cycles. As the US widened the applicability of the cold war pretexts (whether truthfully or manipulatively), other nations were forced to partake in the ever-evasive communist chase. As US interventionism increased and as the justification to do so decreased, other nations were forced to play host to an entity that invariably worsened humanitarian conditions and strengthened military dictatorships. The US presence in other countries, and in particular, US actions to eradicate communist inroads ended up accomplishing the opposite by inflaming popular reaction to enhanced dictatorial powers and routine human rights violations. Ironically, it seems like the progression of US intervention encouraged communist sympathy which thus created a self-fulfilling prophecy and a virtual endless spiral of violence. To condense the idea, the US played the role of instigator by encouraging communist sympathy which in turn inflamed existing rebels, which thereby re-justified the continuation of intervention (though at a more severe level). The reaction from Marxist revolutions to US presence included a greater sphere of influence, increased enfranchisement with the people, and a better form of resistance (with the by-product of heightened violence). With this in consideration, it seems like the revolutionary wheels were almost wholly reliant on the overextension of US policy and its ill-conceived measures to deter communism.

The historical record is long and for the sake of brevity it may be better to choose case-studies. If one doubts the validity of my argument beyond this case-study one may want to refer to the other articles posted below. So that my terms are more definitive, the image that the US engrains in its citizenry is that we are “the stewards of democracy”. To say more of this and lodge my argument in a real example, people should refer to the minimally reported invasion of Panama, which occurred in 1989.

Aside from the military bases in Panama, it was assumed that the Bush administration sough to reassert its control over South America, a design that had already victimized Nicaragua under the Reagan years. In the years before the invasion, the CIA had openly supported Manuel Noriega. How is this known? Even though Bush senior took painful strides in making Noriega seem like a despicable tyrant, the facts – as stated – cannot be refuted. It’s been bitterly conceded that Manuel Noriega was receiving 200,000 dollars annually from the CIA, a testament to his fidelity to the US. Still, one can’t also forget that Noriega had a private meeting with Bush senior years earlier, when the latter was head of the CIA. Even so, the most appalling part of this relationship was the “guns-for-drugs” operation which was initiated by the CIA and managed by Noriega. The program itself established a trade of arms for drugs, a reality which was doubly evil since it implied both the amplification of drug prevalence and military power. Where were these drugs sold? They were sold in the US, a truth difficult to stomach. Indeed, the drugs were flown directly to US airports and military bases, where they were then presumably dispensed to the lower rungs of society, never without – of course – some profit. The profit – at the time – went directly to sabotaging the Sandinistas, a left-leaning political entity that Reagan had vowed to annihilate. This, of course, is another story.

According to the record, General Noriega fell out of favor with the US for providing intelligence to the Sandinistas and Cuba – two of the most stringent political adversaries to US hegemony – a fact rendered unforgivable. If one hasn’t noticed, it is important to realize that the US colludes with morally depraved individuals for the sole purpose of being able to depose them later. That being said, it was convenient to make an alliance with a drug-dealer since there would be no moral question about ousting him. Within the parameters of our media, it would be difficult to have a moral qualm against deposing a drug dealer.

Noriega’s betrayal was not received lightly by Washington, as can be imagined, prompting the Bush administration to take measures to insure his demise. From that moment, the White House began orchestrating plans to provoke an incident between US forces and Panamanian forces. In short, US forces were ordered to suspiciously march down Panamanian streets for no apparent reason. Undoubtedly, this breach of international law elicited the needed provocation to result in an American death. When this happened, the concerted military reaction of the US was unbridled, as usual, leading to a wrath never before witnessed. The US government mercilessly bombed Panama, pulverizing many working class towns and claiming thousands of innocent lives. The number of civilian deaths was grossly underestimated in the US – ranging in numbers no more than 300 – however, any credible source outside of the US speculated that between 2500 and 6000 innocents died.

The US has ruefully admitted to these indiscriminate killings, claiming (in an estimate) that seventy-five percent of all causalities were civilian deaths. One town in particular, El Chorillo, was reduced to a virtual wasteland following the aerial attacks, an event which renamed the town “little Hiroshima”. Following the swift descent of the 37,000 US troops, the soldiers themselves almost immediately took over all hospitals and medical facilities upon their arrival – an oddly fringe issue for an invading force. It is assumed that this was done in an effort to stave off accurate documentation of the casualties, an initiative that is not short of doing “damage control.” Of course, nothing new for a culture that constantly reshapes its past.

Since then, personal testimony has also revealed that US soldiers were using flamethrowers to help reduce the voluminous sight of the dead into something more reasonable, like ash-covered beaches. The job was hastily done though, as seen by the human remnants which were still found buried in the ash, not to mention the many mass graves which were later uncovered. Indeed, in the days, months, and years following the invasion, civilians came across more mass graves, most of which were shoddily hidden – giving credence to the idea that the plan was last-minute. This was not the focus of the US campaign though, only an obstacle, which was surmounted and contained. The US did however succeed in ousting the dreaded drug dealer, only to replace him with a more obedient drug dealer named Guillermo Endara. To cite another causality of historical manipulation, it is well known that the cocaine trade doubled in the years after the US invasion, not before. As for further political solutions, the US managed to regain more control over the Panama Canal while also triumphantly dissolving the Panamanian army, completing all, with scarcely any criticism except for an overwhelmingly incriminating UN vote and a couple of mass graves. All in all, occurring with little moral objection in the US, whose inhabitants scarcely lifted their eyes in contention.

Obama’s inauguration as a Nobel Peace Prize recipient comes on the heels of a continued war in Iraq (which has killed over a million Iraqis, and displaced around three million) and a continued war in Afghanistan. Those are the major contradictions to a public that is meticulously misinformed. Other ripples, beyond those contradictions, have also disputed Obama’s motives for global peace. Such ripples have been evasively reported on, but that is another matter. Under Obama, military supervision has passed from the State Department to the Pentagon, a move that is ominous in its implications. Previously, the worst military abuses were remedied by congressional oversight. This recent change has dashed such a right, giving almost full latitude to the Pentagon in its military operations.

This expansion of military operations coupled with a decline in accountability has been demonstrated in other spheres as well. The militarization of South America, for example, has cast a daunting shadow of US intentions. South American leaders have been vying to free themselves from such a complex, and have even made headway (as demonstrated by President Correa and others), but the general trajectory has still continued, mostly unabated. Some victories, though, deserve mention, like Ecuador’s success in closing down the US military base in Manta. However, the US’s newly hatched deal with Colombia insists that military bases will continue there, along with other programs of similar purpose. As of now, military aid far exceeds economic aid – a situation that comes unprecedented, even when looking at the Cold War years. According to a study conducted by the Washington Office on Latin America, this new move “strengthened military forces at the expense of civilian authorities, exacerbated human rights problems and generated significant social conflict and even political instability.” In 2003 the number of Latin American soldiers trained by the US grew by fifty percent, a trend that is excusable in the case of Obama, but inexcusable in its continuation.

The said militarization of South America did not strictly happen in obscure corners, but was frighteningly illustrated in brazen coup attempts. The US led coup against Venezuela in 2006 was spearheaded by a direct financial commitment of 26 million dollars. Could you imagine if China executed a coup attempt in the US with 26 million dollars? In retrospect, that might actually be a good thing. To bolster any uncertainties, such actions are in accord with a full century of actions. The more contemporary examples are just as instructive. The momentous and widely acclaimed election in Haiti (1990) left the country with its first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The US and France looked at this election with disdain, instituted a coup, and exiled this newly elected leader to Central Africa. As Chomsky has said, this is what happens when you “vote the wrong way.”

In regards to what is transpiring in Honduras, the US has acted tacitly and moderately. I am actually surprised that the US has not made a more earnest effort at vilifying Zelaya – the former left-leaning president. The US, though, has refused to withdraw its ambassador from Honduras, refuses to freeze the bank accounts of the military generals, and refuses to close down the infamous School of the Americas – a training facility that taught many of the high-ranking military generals that seized power. Inaction, quiet as it may be, is still action.

Much like the destructive toll that the “war on terror” has brought to the Arab states, Latin America has also suffered from a euphemism – the proclaimed “war on drugs”. The war on drugs, under genuine scrutiny, crumbles as a legitimate form of drug deterrence. The failure of the war on drugs is acknowledged almost uniformly, without much debate, but why does it continue? In measuring the deficiencies of the war on drugs, many studies have concluded that prevention, treatment, and education are ten times more likely in curbing drug usage than the current format. In regards to foreign policy, drug interdiction outside of the US seems even more inefficient, indicating that latter reforms would be twenty-three times more successful. So why does our belligerent government waste tax-payer money on the least efficient way to fight drugs? The reason, obviously, is that the “war on drugs” has very little to do with drugs, much like the “war on terror” has very little to do with terrorists. In short, they are morally enlightened pretexts to enact other measures. To cite a real example, after Evo Morales was elected the US withdrew its support from Bolivia, claiming that drug exports had increased, endangering world security, and thus justifying their cessation of funds. Ok. At the same time, Colombia’s drug exports had increased phenomenally, and increased – to no great surprise – in tandem with US aid. It may also be forgotten that Colombia has the worst humanitarian record in the hemisphere, but that is probably of no importance. Put simply, the “war on drugs” is a tool used to increase the militarization, and thus control, of those spheres that draw US corporate interest. As a hub and launching point for the war on drugs, Colombia has become victimized by fumigation campaigns that have displaced countless people, making Colombia second only to Sudan when it comes to those internally displaced. That is quintessentially American though, given the three million displaced in Iraq and probably even more displaced in Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan.

This is why I believe Obama does not deserve the Nobel Peace Prize. Firstly, he has violated international law by continuing rendition, a technique used to torture prisoners outside of the US. He has decidedly skirted any possible resolution in Iraq and Afghanistan, and from the looks of it, is continuing a military buildup through these new troop deployments, which, in all honesty, are beginning to resemble the “surge” that he once so adamantly opposed. He has done very little to limit arms sales from the US, he has ignored the application of international law concerning Israeli war crimes, he has exacerbated tensions with Russia by continuing the expansion of NATO, and has stood by the construction of first-strike missile defense systems on the Russian border. I’m afraid that if every Nobel Peace Prize recipient acted this way then the world would devolve into a bleak cellar of violence. If anything, the prize was issued to continue doctrinal culture, which says that we are always right and that we are free to do whatever we please. It’s sad to see that the threshold for such a prize is so low and so suspiciously contradictory.

The Arab Peace Initiative, which has even been signed by such evildoers as Iran, has provided a workable framework for a two state solution. The Arab states have vowed that they will normalize relations with Israel if they provide “a just state” for the Palestinians. So far, Obama has urged the Arab states to take their own measures to implement such a solution. How? I’m not sure. Maybe Obama means that it isn’t enough for Jordan to continue accepting Palestinian refugees, so many in fact, that they represent 60% of their population, or – perhaps – that Lebanon has not endured enough Israel incursions and near-disasters to warrant being an active member for peace. Israel, on the other hand, has evaded any and all criticism from the Obama administration. Not even the most flagrant and obvious of transgressions, the settlements, has received much notice. The Obama administration has vaguely disapproved of the settlements much in the same way as the Bush administration has supported a two-state solution. Indeed, it was clear in 1973 that Israel had blatantly chosen expansion over peace when they rejected an agreement with Egypt to instead colonize northeast Sinai. To say more of Obama, his rhetoric is impeccable, but his actions convey his true stance, this can easily be illustrated by his vow to continue Israeli aid for ten more years, an action that is assumed to be unconditional. What is most frightening, however, is that this new commitment will promise Israel more money than what the Bush administration had pledged. The idea that Israel will revise its priorities without pressure is unlikely, and becomes a misplaced fantasy if taking party rhetoric seriously. The 1999 Likud platform of Netanyahu, for example, proclaimed without reservation that their party “rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan river.” Nevertheless, Netanyahu’s government also said that if there ever was a state, Palestinians could call it a “state”, if they wished, or “fried chicken”. As we speak, there are 462,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza. If anyone cares, the World Court ruled in 2004 that such a practice was illegal, and a breach of international law. Will justice prevail? I’m scared to answer.

The situation with Israel is just one microcosm that – for better or for worse – has captivated spectators on all sides. To be sure, the situation has received prolific media attention despite its inaccuracies. Other places do not have this privilege. One of the fore issues in South America, for example, has been the undisclosed US presence there. UNASUR, the South American equivalent to the European Union, convened a couple of weeks ago to discuss the motives, and reasons, behind US bases in Colombia. In what became a cacophony of outrage, every head of state condemned Colombia for allowing such developments while immediately urging the country to do something about it. Although there was no final resolution, the sentiments of rage seemed clear, especially for a country like Venezuela that has endured two coup attempts by the US in the last ten years. Colombia probably won’t do anything about it though, given our unwavering financial backing for the country – the reasons, presumably, for being integral in our renditions and out-of-sight torture facilities. If anyone cares, Obama has decided to continue this operation of rendition – a practice that people once thought was only intrinsic to the Bush administration. To show that both parties are agents of such criminality, rendition first started under the Clinton administration, a political regime that also had a hand in supplying more than 80% of the weapons used by Turkey to exterminate hundreds of thousands of Kurds in what is likely to be documented as genocide. That aside, the larger and more pertinent question still stands: What real democracy sends their prisoners abroad?

As a caveat to those invested in Obama, do not accept his wording – however beautiful – but judge him through action. So far, he has sent 20,000 more troops to Afghanistan and has reneged on his commitment to withdrawal troops from Iraq. Though he promised to start withdrawing troops in six months, he has now reverted to a more convenient and open-ended date, 25 months. Please do not afford Obama the same complacency we gave Bush, unless we keep his feet to the fire, he will not change nor implement change.

A pesar de eso, las dudas de Ruanda fueron convertidas a acciones positivas. Recientemente, Ruanda ha estado en una época floreciente. Inversionistas extranjeros han notado en este nuevo país un lugar bastante tranquilo y seguro. Como otros países del continente, la economía de Ruanda ha crecido cuatro por ciento cada ano. Este porcentaje es una señal de la potencia de Ruanda y su renacimiento. Además, Ruanda tiene una salud nacional y educación que funciona por arriba del promedio de África. Por cierto, el punto de vista ha cambiado mucho sobre Ruanda.

El surgimiento de Ruanda no fue posible sin la conciliación que tenia que pasar entre las victimas y los que fueron juzgados. Para asegurar la unificación, los que fueron juzgados recibieron un castigo leve. Era un “sistema autóctono”, donde las personas confesaban sus delitos a consejos locales. En esencia, el tema era “perdonar y reintegrar” a las personas en sus lugares de procedencia. Con eso, la fuerza de la comunidad sobrevivió.

De seguro, el proceso de unificación chocaba con otros puntos de vista. Muchos adoptaron una postura crítica sobre el castigo de los que fueron juzgados. Los críticos declamaron que el castigo no era suficiente. Defendiendo el desarrollo de la unificación, el presidente actual de Ruanda, Paul Kagame, dice que la justicia internacional tiene fallas y es parcial: “Por que parece extraño que se aplique la justicia a alguien en Europa que tiene una responsabilidad? Ellos nunca pueden hacer algo mal, por lo tanto, la justicia no se aplica.” Con esta “filosofía rectora” se refirió a Francia, porque ellos armaron y entrenaron a los militares dominados que empezaron el genocidio. Por lo menos, Kagame tiene razón cuando implica que hay un estándar doble. Aunque haya mucha crítica sobre el genocidio, el ambiente de ahora es el de apoyar a Ruanda. Con cada día los partidarios se multiplican.

To date, private insurers and pharmaceutical companies are scrambling to reverse public opinion. They want to kill this bill, and if we don’t fight, they very well may. As Dennis Kucinich pointed out, a full ninety-six percent of Americans “distrust” insurance companies – reasoning enough for their renewed campaigns. This hate is not indiscriminate. In the annals of unreported history Americans know that premiums, co-pays, and deductibles have grown astronomically – beyond any fairness. Put in global perspective, health care in the US is roughly double in cost than any other country. Is this just a coincidence? Put simply, no. In an effort to sabotage the bill, these groups have begun a fear campaign – all of which – will be debunked here.

Allies of pharmaceutical companies and insurers claim that this bill is not financially sound, a threat that will likely result in a tax hike. The latter portion is correct, but the taxing will be directed to our wealthiest individuals – those that have benefited enormously over the past eight years. To reiterate, the surtax will only affect the richest one percent. I am not personally bothered by this, since statistics confirm that the richest one percent accumulate about twenty percent of our nation’s wealth. A reality that affirms one grim fact, that such a disparity has not been seen since 1928. I think we can say that taking a fraction of a fraction of their wealth is justifiable. After all, the system has favored them and now they should reciprocate. That aside, the tax hike is much more benign then thought. According to The Center for Tax Justice, the surtax will only hit five percent of small businesses. And in defining tax obligations, individuals making 280,000 or couples making 350,000. All of this too is said independently from the vast savings the US will probably enjoy from the new system.

If one looks at Canada – for example – taxation is roughly equal on both sides of the border. Under their system, Canada spends about 11% of its GDP on universal health care. In the US we spend roughly 17% of our GDP on health care, a system which (don’t forget) excludes at least 50 million people. How is it that Canada saves money? The answer – in no small measure – is due to the large overheads we in the US must deal with. As an umbrella term for bureaucracy and paper work, overhead costs range from 15-35 percent. When the job is outsourced to private insurers the job gets very inefficient, especially since there are many insurers – making the task clunky and not streamlined. For the sake of mention, the overhead costs for Medicaid are at about three percent. So why must 800 million dollars go to inefficient, greedy institutions every year? It’s senseless. Moreover, without universal health care, premiums will surely go up since the uninsured will have to be “picked up” by private insurers. As the economist Dean Baker points out, if Americans ignore this call-to-arms they “can expect to be hit with the largest tax increase in the history of the world – all of it going into the profits of the health care industry.”

So please, fight for our right to join other industrialized nations in universal health care. It is a battle worth winning. We will save money as a country and as tax-payers, and will do unto others an indispensable service – a service that is an inalienable right.

The corporate media has taken painful strides to create a narrative that depicts Iran as the aggressor despite overtures of compromise and international condemnation. In short, the news has characterized Iran as a rogue state in pursuit of nuclear weapons. The news – however – has conveniently forgotten a few details. Without relying on intense logic, one can assume that even if Iran had nuclear weapons it would be as a means of deterrence – a device insuring national sovereignty. The chances that Iran would use nuclear weapons are incredibly slim, rendering the issue almost negligible. Would Iran really use nuclear weapons with neighbors such as Israel, Pakistan, and India? That aside, Iran is the only country in the region that is part of the Nonproliferation Treaty, a compact setting regulations towards nuclear pursuits. Israel, Pakistan, and India – all countries that received enormous aid in their nuclear programs from the US – are part of no such treaty. It is well known that Pakistan became nuclear through the indispensable help of Ronald Reagan, a tradition that was extended to India under Bush II. One could say that these administrations took an active effort in expediting the nuclear programs of stated countries. To say more of this, Kissinger and Wolfowitz on the eve of Iran’s 1979 revolution pushed heavily to arm Iran – a then ally – with nuclear weapons. Indeed, the US gave Iran their first nuclear reactor in the time after Mosaddeq. The obvious double standard is irrefutable, so in the context of this situation the US should tread carefully. If one resorts to history one knows that Iraq did not begin entertaining nuclear weaponry until after Israel attacked its first nuclear reactor in 1981. The US has no reason to be aggressive in this situation then, and should be humbled by the past. The current instigation against Iran is inexplicable given this history of contradiction.

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